This is an interesting week in US history. April 12th, was the 155th anniversary of the firing upon Fort Sumter. April 13th was the 273rd birthday of President Thomas Jefferson. Today, April 14th, marks the 151st anniversary of the shooting of President Abraham Lincoln, which would lead to his death on the 15th.
Normally, a 151st anniversary would likely go unnoticed. Usually we commemorate the 50th, the 75th, or the 150th anniversary of an event. However, given that 2016 is perhaps the most significant election in recent memory, no doubt the legacy of one of the United States’ most consequential presidents will surely get raised. That legacy stands in stark ideological contrast to that of Thomas Jefferson.
Democrats will say that Lincoln was spiritually a Democrat; the Republican Party has changed and Lincoln had more in common with the DNC than the GOP.
Republicans will argue that the Democrats cannot hide from their racist past; Lincoln was not just a Republican, he was the FIRST Republican President.
They are both right, however neither should race out to grab that mantle.
Lincoln was indeed a Republican. Furthermore, Lincoln was not just any Republican, he was effectively the founder of that party. Still, the “top-down,” anti-states rights policy positions of the 19th Century Republicans have far more in common with the Democrat Party of the 21st Century than their RNC descendants. In this regard, the Democrats are right. Lincoln was more like them.
Correspondingly, after careful thought about America’s 16th President, I have come to the following conclusion: Lincoln Sucked!
There are two primary reasons that I ascribe to my devaluation of Lincoln.
- The Civil War was avoidable – Lincoln started an unnecessary war; a war that was not over slavery.
- Lincoln would have crushed the South far worse than anything that happened during Reconstruction; myths of Lincoln’s magnanimity are grossly exaggerated.
Let’s get into it… “why” Lincoln sucked.
- The Civil War was avoidable
The South was right – they should have been allowed to leave the union, or the “United” States. The Constitution established a union of independent states through a voluntary association. Whether you agree or disagree that slavery was the cause of the Civil War (I personally disagree; more on that in a moment), it is hard to argue the illegality of the South’s right to leave the Union.
Article IV, Section 3 of the US Constitution states clearly: “New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress.”
Correspondingly, a state that votes to reject the US Government and its Constitution should, in theory, no longer be a state. Since popular consent is required to accept the US Constitution, it should also be grounds to reject the US Constitution. This is the whole point of the democratic process, especially in a federated architecture like the republican (small ‘R’) United States.
Obviously, the myriad of secession declarations enacted by the “legislatures of the states concerned” were cause for the revocation of affiliation with states that chose to remain within the greater United States.
Needless to say, popular consent in the Southern states was clearly against maintaining a voluntary association with Northern states. They wanted to part ways. They had that right. How do we know? Because a different group of states considered and advocated secession and were granted that open right. New England almost left the union in 1804 and 1814.
Comparing Presidential Responses to Secession Movements: Jefferson-Madison vs Lincoln
In 1804 the North was incensed. Specifically, New England merchants were aggravated by a number of Democratic-Republican President Thomas Jefferson’s decisions which they felt largely favored the South. Consequently, a strong secession movement began, led by fellow Founding Father, Massachusetts’ Senator Timothy Pickering. 
Here is how Jefferson responded: he supported them. 
Jefferson understood their concerns and allowed political reality to take root. The decision to secede met political and economic reality. In 1804, New England remained in the Union… for a while.
In 1812, however, North-South divisions were only further inflamed. The Embargo Act of 1807 hurt Northeast trade with the United Kingdom. The subsequent war with the UK made matters for New Englanders worse. Yet again, New England not only re-embraced secession, they outright waged war against the United States! When war broke out, New England responded by helping to defeat the young United States.
Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to send militia in support of the war effort. Massachusetts went so far as to build a fort, ostensibly to defend its territory from British aggression (Fort Strong). But they pointed the cannons at the interior of their city instead of the harbors – the place from which an obvious transatlantic invasion would start. Why? Bostonians chose to dissuade an American invasion they knew Madison would launch.
But how did Madison respond to New England’s actions, which led to the direct deaths, capture, or surrender of more than 12,000 Americans from other areas of the United States? Nothing. Madison chose to diffuse the situation and allow cooler heads to prevail. Madison was well within his rights to suppress the acts of New England leaders, but he withdrew the US military and ultimately won over the population of the greater North.
Again, in 1814, the Anti-War Federalist leaders of New England led a more pronounced attempt at secession. The Hartford Convention of December 15, 1814 to January 5, 1815, placed the fragile young republic in an awkward position. It was an open rhetorical revolt seeking distinct secession and/or a revision to the Constitution in their favor. They purposely chose the timing while the United States was brokering a peace deal with the British Government to hurt US negotiations.
Again, Madison did nothing to suppress their free speech, freedom of assembly, or their calls for secession. Rather, Madison continued to lead the United States despite these treacherous acts.
Contrast those actions with Lincoln’s response.
Despite secession declarations, the economic and political reality of the mid-19th Century South was that secession was highly unlikely to succeed with or without a war. The two halves of the United States were intricately tied through commerce, language, law, and foreign threats. Lincoln could have avoided war by simply inviting the two parties to sit down and discuss how secession would be formed. Most likely, if anything, a semi-autonomous region within the United States whole would have arisen. That is not without precedent. Modern day Scotland comes to mind, or in the 19th century, Bavaria and Sicily are good examples of a federation with semi-autonomous operating models.
Despite statements indicating that Lincoln was “the last straw” for the South due in part to his supposed pro-abolition stance, the two parties, North and South, were experiencing significant troubles independent of the slave issue or for that matter, Lincoln. The 1828 Tariff Crisis, the 1837 Deflationary Crisis, and the 1846 Mexican Invasion of Texas all played a greater role in sharpening the regional divisions. The latter point played a key role in making Lincoln unacceptable as a leader for the South. House Representative Lincoln’s “Spot Resolutions”effectively called into question the integrity of the South, especially Texans. Lincoln called Southerners a bunch of liars in 1847. Thus, Lincoln was a known commodity to Southerners… and not a good one.
Still, the South did not seek war. They sought an amicable divorce. No individual put the South’s intentions more succinctly than Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis, who gave his farewell address to the United States in the chambers of the US Senate on January 21st, 1861:
“… I find in myself, perhaps, a type of the general feeling of my constituents towards yours. I am sure I feel no hostility to you… I wish you well; and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I represent towards those whom you represent. I therefore feel that I but express their desire when I say I hope, and they hope, for peaceful relations with you, though we must part… if you so will it.”
Jefferson Davis did not want war. He was not alone. Most of the South’s leadership, while recognizing a possible attempt by the North to forcibly compel the South to stay in the Union, openly expressed a desire to avoid the prospect of war altogether. Both Northern peace Democrats and Southern leaders sought to avoid war. However, whether or not an avoidance of war was sought, Lincoln purposely instigated war with none other than using the firing upon Fort Sumter as a pretext for an invasion of the South.
The Fort Sumter Debacle
Northerners like to point to the firing upon Fort Sumter as a legitimate casus belli. They are wrong. There are convenient facts that are omitted from the collective conscious that needs to be “re-remembered.”
Lincoln was well aware of an agreement made between his predecessor, President James Buchanan and South Carolina. The Buchanan Administration had already conceded all federally held positions, building, and forts south of the Mason-Dixon by the end of 1860. In sum, the United States had de facto recognized the right to secession by not maintaining those properties.  Furthermore, the Buchanan Administration negotiated for the peaceful removal of Union troops. The last outpost on the contiguous United States was Fort Sumter.
In December 1860, Buchanan agreed to a compromise with South Carolina’s Congressional delegation. The Federal Government would vacate South Carolina; South Carolina would allow it to withdraw its troops and provisions peacefully. Unbeknownst to Major Robert Anderson, who was not informed of the peace agreement, Anderson occupied Sumter on December 26th.
South Carolinians rightfully felt duped. But matters went from bad to worse. Rather than uphold his agreement, Buchanan chose to renege. He ordered reinforcements to Sumter on December 31st. This act enraged South Carolina, which rightfully thought a peaceful settlement had been made, only to have Anderson take Sumter in the dead of night.
For reasons we will never know, Buchanan chose to stay the course and as such, South Carolina demanded that federal troops honor their agreement and leave. Buchanan refused. Worse, the newly inaugurated Lincoln, aware that Buchanan had lied to the South, chose to send more reinforcements, including three war ships, several hundred sailors, and additional provisions to Sumter.
Now STOP! Consider how different Lincoln acted toward secession than Madison who, less than fifty years earlier, chose NOT to send troops into an openly hostile New England?
Of course, we know the rest of the story… on April 12th, 1861, the South Carolina militia fired upon Fort Sumter… killing no one. Lincoln chose this action, the North’s failure to owe up to its agreements and South Carolina’s response, as a pretext for war. An invasion of the South was begun in earnest.
Slavery did not necessitate the war
Even those who may find some justification in the belief that the Civil War led to the end of slavery are in fact wrong. Not only did Lincoln not end slavery (that was the 13th Amendment), slavery would endure in the North until 1901. Other states that stayed in the Union, such as slave holding Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, all maintained the institution of slavery well after the Civil War.
As for the Emancipation Proclamation? A farce!
Lincoln’s famous Emancipation Proclamation gave freedom to those slaves in territories that were in “armed insurrection” or to put it more poignantly, those states with which he had no control. The Southern states and territories with which US federal troops occupied, such as New Orleans, Louisiana or Tennessee, kept slavery as an institution, with Lincoln’s blessing. Black historian, Lerone Bennett, Jr., called the proclamation a “hoax” designed to keep Blacks enslaved until they could be repatriated in Africa.
The Emancipation Proclamation appears to have been more geared toward European, especially British, political consumption than an attempt to free the slaves. The UK was seriously considering an alliance with the South, to include foreign recognition, but slavery was the sticking point. If the South received British support for their cause, the North would have lost. To keep Parliamentary recognition from the CSA, Lincoln needed to make the war a moral endeavor.
Otherwise, the war was intended to suppress an “insurrection”… or as I see it, keep a South that was very different from the North. The Crittenden–Johnson Resolution, the Congressional resolution that authorized the war, explicitly made the war about an insurrection, not slavery. Lincoln did not have the power to free the slaves as a result of any Civil War outcome, even if he wanted to do so. He was bound by law to limit the goals of the fight.
The fact of the matter is that slavery as an economic institution, post-industrial revolution, was on the way out anyway. The South would have likely discarded slavery on its own, mostly due to automation. Whereas the institution may have survived into the late 1800s, there is very little doubt that slavery would have ceased as an institution about the same time for two key reasons (A) the lower cost of capital and lower barriers to entry of hiring cheap immigrants versus buying and maintaining slaves and (B) innovations in the combustion engine.
Even if the institution of slavery survived in the South until 1900, that would be one year less than it lasted in the North.
There is strong reason to suggest that Lincoln could have sat with his Southern counterparts and, at a minimum, called for a cooling off period. Congress certainly seemed desperate to find a solution if Lincoln would not. But Lincoln chose war by instigating the Sumter crisis, then choose to invade the South, instead of negotiate peaceful alternatives.
Imagine if Lincoln had done that which Madison had done: engaged the population of the disaffected region more directly by imploring some form of compromise and logic.
- Lincoln would have crushed the South
My other issue with Lincoln is more profound: Lincoln hated the South and would have done worse than that which Reconstruction exacted upon the South.
There is a convenient myth that even I once believed. Lincoln would have been benevolent to the secessionists after the war, but John Wilkes Booth killed him prematurely, thus ushering in decades of horrible Reconstruction policies that crushed the South for a century. That myth is false. Lincoln wanted to punish the South… badly.
The Wade-Davis Bill and Plans for Reconstruction
The origins of Lincoln’s purported goodwill stems from Lincoln’s December 1863 Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, also known as the “Ten Percent Plan” and the subsequent battle that resulted when Lincoln’s plan was rejected. The alternative posited by a group known as the Radical Republicans entitled the “Wade-Davis Bill” was presented. The former plan allowed re-entrance into the Union after 10% of a seceded state took an oath of loyalty, an acceptance by the state of Lincoln’s emancipation conditions, and allowed for an amnesty toward those who fought for the South. The latter plan required stricter, broad oaths and severe punishments for Confederate soldiers and leaders.
On the surface, that seems nice. Lincoln, the moderate, sought reconciliation in the face of vengeful Northern politicians. When the Ten Percent Plan was rejected, the Wade-Davis bill passed in both chambers of Congress. Lincoln, the great national patriarch, vetoed the bill. That bill, however, would ultimately reemerge and form the genesis of the crushingly brutal post-war treatment of the South under the Johnson and Grant Administrations. Too bad it is a false narrative.
Lincoln did not veto the Wade-Davis Bill. Lincoln pocket vetoed the Wade-Davis Bill. There is a very big difference.
In December 1863 Lincoln was faced with a strong reelection challenge in 1864. The war had been brutal and nasty. The North had fared poorly at best. Defeat after defeat was only briefly ameliorated by the victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and most recently, Chattanooga. But Confederate victories at Chickamauga, Sterling’s Plantation, and Sabine Pass proved that the CSA still intended to fight. Grant was taking over and now the war was about to get bloodier than ever before.
Lincoln needed to show the United States electorate that he was the “reasonable” one in the conflict. He offered the South a “respectful” option out of conflict. This was political posturing for show… nothing more. When Congress failed to take up his Ten Percent Plan, Lincoln not only failed to further pursue its passage, adoption, and/or revision, he just dropped the issue outright.
Meanwhile, he never vetoed the crushing Wade-Davis Bill. He pocket vetoed the bill. A pocket veto is a procedural move by which a President does not weigh in on a bill directly; rather, he chooses to make a “no decision,” thus effectively rendering the bill dead by placing it into limbo. Since the President has a Constitutionally mandated ten days to respond to a bill (sign or veto), the President can only employ the pocket veto if Congress adjourns before the ten days are up.
Scholars of this matter point to the fact that Lincoln was given only one hour prior to adjournment to consider the bill, only further proving that Lincoln was given no choice but to pocket veto the bill. Furthermore, they contend that Wade, a leader of the “Radical Republicans,” wanted to punish the South with such severity that Lincoln’s magnanimity required a veto. After all, the benevolent leader would not purposely do harm to those whom he only wished to return to the loyal Union fold.
In this regard we are reminded of the Biblical story of the return of the prodigal son, whereby the wise and loving father (Lincoln) embraces the wayward son (the South) over the protestations of his responsible brother (Wade, Northern Radical Republicans)).
Historians and Lincoln acolytes submit the gratuitous language of Wade and Davis in the post-pocket veto as “proof” of this contest of wills. They paint a picture of Punitive Reconstruction versus Gracious Reconciliation. To prove their point, Lincoln worshipers often highlight an appeal to the Union public, written by Wade and Davis, entitled the “Manifesto of Ben. Wade and H. Winter Davis against the President’s Proclamation.”  They claim that this undermining document, published during an election year, is proof positive that the men were political enemies and did not see eye-to-eye on reconstruction.
But something smells fishy about a Republican Senator and a Republican Congressman writing so scathing a piece in a national newspaper during the reelection year of a Republican President in the middle of so consequential a crisis as the Civil War.
Then I read the language of the document. Wade and Davis say something very interesting in the heart of their manifesto. Lincoln knew what was in the bill and actually helped draft it!
They begin by stating that time was not a factor, since the House of Representatives voted to move out their adjournment in order to give Lincoln more time to consider their proposal:
“…whereas the said bill was presented to the President… less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of said session… this bill was presented With other bills that were signed. Within that hour the time for the sine die adjournment was three times postponed… [and if requested] for more time by the President to consider this bill [it] would have secured a further postponement.”
Then they point out the fact that Lincoln knew what the bill would contain, thus giving Lincoln the opportunity to, at a minimum, outright veto the bill if he disagreed with its content:
“The bill had been discussed and considered for more than a month in the House of Representatives, which it passed on the 4th of May; it was reported to the Senate on the 27th of May without material amendment, and passed the Senate absolutely as it came from the House on the 2d of July, Ignorance of its contents is out of the question.”
Then they land the coup d ’grace. They point out that Lincoln helped draft the brutal reconstruction bill that would ultimately go into effect after his death. You read that correctly. To feign ignorance of its content is an outright lie (emphasis on the following added by this author):
“Indeed, at his request (Lincoln’s), a draft of a bill, substantially the same in all material points and identical in the points objected to by the proclamation, had been laid before him for his consideration in the Winter of 1862 — 3. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose the provisions of the bill took the President by surprise.”
Lincoln did not only know of the bill and its contents, he helped formulate it!
It is a lie that Lincoln was a benevolent leader who would have treated the South with kindness after the war. The reason Lincoln took no action against the Wade-Davis Bill, the basis upon which all future reconstruction and punitive impositions would be applied toward the South, was because it was HIS BILL!
Lincoln hated the South. He hated the South at least as far back as 1847. Lincoln certainly hated them after the war began.
The only reason that Lincoln would not veto a bill that he helped mold and draft in 1864 was simple political expediency. Lincoln needed to look like the good guy to a Union populace tired of a brutal and bloody war. It was not because he was kind. If Lincoln had good intentions toward the South, he would have vetoed the bill outright. He did not.
Butler, Sherman, and Lincoln… oh my!
Sherman’ march is notorious for its introduction of total war, which opened devastation upon the population. This was a new strategic phenomenon. Whereas civilians were always historically harmed by war, they were rarely targeted. William Tecumseh Sherman, Ulysses S. Grant, and Abraham Lincoln changed that precedent.
Those who argue that Sherman was uniquely at fault for the malicious devastation of the South, to include rapes, murders, and the burning of Southern infrastructure, they are wrong. Lincoln gave his blessing to the degradations experienced by the South. As Sherman wrote in 1864, “The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance on South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate but feel she deserves all that seems in store for her.” 
If you wonder what was in store for the South, post-war, one need not look much further than its treatment by the North during the war. This was not a military engagement to win the hearts and minds. This was a war intended not only to destroy the South, but to BREED her destruction.
There is no doubt that Black women experienced the greatest horrors of rape during the Civil War. Union soldiers took immense liberties raping Black women whom they knew had little recourse. Rarely, if ever, did these rapes get reported and when they were, most often went unpunished. There are a few recorded court martials of predominantly Irish Union soldiers raping recently freed Black slaves. In some cases, gang rapes of White women by Black soldiers resulted in the execution of Black soldiers.
When a gang of Black Union soldiers were arrested and tried for the crime of gang raping a White Confederate Captain’s wife outside of Atlanta, their defense: “we were ordered to humiliate her.”
But the rape of Southern women, went largely under-reported until recent women’s studies academics have begun exploring the historical use of rape in the Civil War. We know that Major General Benjamin Butler, during his occupation of New Orleans, required Union troops to treat Southern women like prostitutes if they were offensive or expressed support for the South. General Order No. 28 stated:
“As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women… of New Orleans… any female shall by word, gesture, or movement insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States she shall be regarded… as a woman of the town plying her avocation.
Despite the fact that this order, issued on 1 May 1862, received international outrage, Lincoln neither ordered its reversal nor removed Butler from command. In December 1862, when Butler was removed from command of the city, it appears his removal was the result of a criminal investigation into city finances, not the mistreatment of New Orleans’ residents. Meanwhile, when the British House of Lords uniformly sent a message to Lincoln protesting this outrage against Southern women, Lincoln shrugged.
Lincoln’s feelings on the matter can be summarized as the following: Southern women got what they deserved for inspiring their men into war.
That reaction is not that of a benevolent and forgiving national leader. It is the reaction of a sociopath.
There is no evidence, whatsoever, that Lincoln would have treated the South better had he survived his second term. None.
Summary of a Sociopath
There are those who would argue that the South got what it deserved. They claim that the enslavement of Blacks necessitated war and brought upon the South’s own demise. Lincoln, they would argue, was the leader of a great cause of freedom. They are wrong.
The war was avoidable. Lincoln wanted war. He got one.
The end of slavery as an institution was neither the goal of Lincoln, who hated Blacks, nor the reason for the war. Lincoln, and his Northern counterparts had a far greater and more maniacal reason for waging war against the South. Northern industry was growing more dependent on the South’s agricultural output. To keep the North growing richer, the South had to stay within the Union – and accept the protectionist policies that helped Northern industry to the South’s detriment. The March 1861 Morrill Tariff was yet one more example of Northern economic aggression.
More importantly, Lincoln, who is often sanctified on both sides of the Mason-Dixon, was not going to allow the South to keep its means of waging a future war of secession. No, the North needed to utterly destroy the South and ensure its perpetual subjugation. To leave it intact post-war would only have invited a future war a generation or two later. Lincoln and his Republican allies knew this. The goal was to forever devastate the South, whether by means of subordinate citizen status (Wade-Davis Bill), the destruction of infrastructure (Sherman’s March), or the involuntary breeding of future generations of children with Northern origins by unwilling Southern mothers.
Lincoln wanted to destroy the South as early as 1846. He wanted to devastate her during the war. He definitely wanted to forever crush her after the war.
There was nothing nice or kind about Lincoln. He was an egotistical animal. He was evil personified.
Thus, in 2016, in the midst of a great and transformational presidential campaign, it is important to understand that Lincoln is NOT whom we want as a future leader.
We should prefer Madison, a Virginian who embraced the totality of Liberty… because to put it mildly, Lincoln sucked.
 US Constitution, as reprinted by Cornell University Law School, (emphasis embedded in the quote is the author’s), https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiv
 This led to the impressment crises that ultimately led to the War of 1812. For more on the subject I recommend the following: Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, A Patriot’s History of the United States, Chapters 5&6, New York: Sentinel Publishing, 2014 Copyright Edition
 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestley, 29 January 1804, US Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mtj.old/mtj1/029/029_0998_0999.pdf
 Public Broadcasting System, WBUR, “Why New England Almost Seceded Over The War Of 1812,” 15 June 2012, http://radioboston.wbur.org/2012/06/15/new-england-succession
 Some argue that removing federal troops from New England was a punishment by Madison that left New England vulnerable to British attack. Those critics ignore that (A) New Englanders avoided any contribution of troops to the war effort at a time when the US military was small and largely a collection of state-centric militia reserves (militias) and (B) the coastal “Blue Light” system in New England. New Englanders assisted the British through the use of blue lights which they would shine from their homes to warn the British of attempted American blockade runners or approaching US Navy vessels. This allowed the British to seize more US cargo and ambush the American Navy. For more on these topics read: Charles Raymond Brown, The Northern Confederacy: According to the Plans of the “Essex Junto,” 1796-1814, published dissertation, Princeton University, October 1915, https://books.google.com/books?id=gDBCAAAAIAAJ&dq=federalist%20party%20massachusetts&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q=federalist%20party%20massachusetts&f=false
 Abraham Lincoln, “The Spot Resolutions,” 1847, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/lincoln-resolutions/
 Jefferson Davis, “Jefferson Davis’ Farewell Address,” 21 January 1861, https://jeffersondavis.rice.edu/Content.aspx?id=87
 William Freehling, New York Times, “James Buchanan’s Activist Blunder,” 5 January 2011, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/james-buchanans-activist-blunder/?_r=0
 Jessica Masulli Reyes, USA Today, “Delaware Legislature apologizes for slavery,” 11 February 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2016/02/10/delaware-slavery-apology/80202658/
 James Ronald and Walter Donald Kennedy explore this point in great detail in The South Was Right!, Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing, 2014 Edition
 Kenneth L. Deutsch and Joseph Fornieri, Lincoln’s American Dream: Clashing Political Perspectives, Chapter 3, “Forced into Gory Revisionism: A Review of Forced into Glory: Abraham Lincoln’s White Dream, Lucas E. Morel,” Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005, https://books.google.com/books?id=C-YAbM7YYCIC&pg=PT35#v=onepage&q=bennett&f=false
 There is great debate on this subject. Many authors argue that slavery was profitable. They often refer to a study concluded by Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer entitled “The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South,” which was run in The Journal of Political Economy, in April, 1958. The unfortunate shortcomings of that work – and many which have since linked their findings to that work – is that the authors, macroeconomists using antiquated models, fail to understand or even tackle the issues of diminishing returns, the benefits of scale when weighing agricultural output, post-productive slave care, and most importantly, the cost of capital. The latter point, the cost of capital, was a major factor in the 1837 Deflation Crisis. The true “winners’ in the slave trade were not specifically Southern plantation owners (who received mixed results from slavery). Rather, it was predominantly New York banks and financiers who used slaves as collateral. Most historians and even many economists tragically lack the business education to understand the dynamics of capital costs.
 Wade-Davis Bill of 1864, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=37&page=transcript
 The Pocket Veto process is explained on the House of Representative’s website, “Presidential Vetoes: 1789 to Present”: http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/
 Reprinted by The New York Times, originally published 9 August 1864, by Senator Ben Wade (R, OH) and Congressman Henry Winter Davis (R, MD), http://www.nytimes.com/1864/08/09/news/war-upon-president-manifesto-ben-wade-h-winter-davis-against-president-s.html?pagewanted=all
 SAA, para 4
 SAA, para 5
 SAA, para 5
 John Whiteclay Chambers II, Oxford Encyclopedia, “Sherman’s March to the Sea,” http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Shermans_March_1864.aspx
 Julie Beck, The Atlantic, “Gender, Race, and Rape During the Civil War” (Interview of author Kim Murphy), 20 February 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/02/gender-race-and-rape-during-the-civil-war/283754/
 Maureen Stutzman, “Rape in the American Civil War: Race, Class, and Gender in the Case of Harriet McKinley and Perry Pierson,” http://www.albany.edu/womensstudies/journal/2009/stutzman.html
 Ironically, the only incidents in which soldiers – Black or White – were charged with raping women were incidents in which a complaint was lodged (often by doctors, not the victims) and only after the burden of proof on Southern women were met. That required her to present herself to the commanding officers, identify her assailants, and present witnesses. Black soldiers accused and often killed for the crime of rape almost uniformly reported that they were typically ordered to do so by their White officers. Only when met with the shocking and potentially damaging prospect of having ordered an “inferior beast” (i.e., Black) to sexually assault a “superior woman” (i.e., White), were Black soldiers handed over to suffer for the crime of rape by the very same White officers that appear to have ordered such degrading treatment. This rarely, however, occurred with White men, who were often given a free pass for the crime. Unlike White soldiers, who were convicted only after having been reprimanded multiple times, Black soldiers were rarely given a second chance. Thus, we do not really know the true number of rapes perpetrated against Southern women by Northern troops since the crime was generally added as an afterthought and typically only prosecuted against Black and immigrant soldiers.